Debra Satz’s “Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets”

Debra Satz’s book is a very welcomed addition to the growing engagement of philosophers with questions of morality, ethics and markets. Some of this engagement has been well publicised by philosophers such as Michael Sandel whose BBC’s Reith Lecture on Markets and Morals constitutes a good introduction to the topic.
Debra Satz does not write to popularize the theme of markets and morals, although Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale is written in a very engaging style, capturing complex arguments in a few crisp paragraphs. The starting point for Satz is that one-dimensional view of markets prevalent in both economics and political philosophy prevents us from appreciating that markets are more than mechanisms for the efficient allocation of resources. Markets can also shape our politics and our civic culture. Particular types of markets – what she terms “noxious markets” – may restrain or subvert the development of desirable human qualities, shape preferences in undesirable ways or promote objectionable social relationships. The contrast with the approach taken by economists such as Alvin Roth to repugnant markets, which regards repugnance as a barrier to the expansion of markets that can be overcome by focusing on trade-offs, should be noted.
Chapter 1 starts with the traditional definition of markets as arenas of voluntary exchange which in Satz’s words, requires a thorough philosophical examination.  Taking a leaf out of the institutional economists’ book, Satz makes a vital distinction between exchanges and markets. Exchanges are events or episodes, whilst markets are institutions aggregating large numbers of exchanges over time. For exchanges to turn into markets, many conditions need to be fulfilled: property rights regimes, rules for drawing up and enforcing contracts and agreements, informal rules to be respected and so on.  Thus markets should not be seen as opposite of states, but depend on the state to function effectively – a point reminiscent of Douglass C. North’s (1991) arguments in the classic Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
The core of Satz’s argument is featured in chapter 4 where she elaborates on the notion of “noxious markets”. For Satz, “noxious markets” do not just hey represent inferior ways of valuing particular types of goods but also that  they undermine the conditions that people require if they are to relate as equals in economic exchange relationships. Satz goes on to identify four parameters that are relevant to the qualification of particular markets as noxious. These parameters are: vulnerability, weak agency, harmful outcomes for individuals, and harmful outcomes for society.
The first two parameters relate to the characteristics of the parties before they enter into an exchange. Markets can arise in circumstances in which some people are so poor or so desperate that they accept trades and terms of exchange that they would not contemplate in normal circumstances – e.g. the sale of a kidney for transplant whether legally or illegally. Other trades arise in circumstances in which some parties have either poor information about what they are exchanging, or in which some cases are not direct participants in the exchange but depend on others’ decisions – e.g. paid surrogacy motherhood. In these cases, a party is said to have “weak agency”.
The second two parameters that Satz proposes are more familiar to those acquainted with the notions of externalities or overflows, and are characteristics of the outcomes of a market. Some markets may operate in ways that leave some participants severely disadvantaged, for example, circumstances in which they become destitute or in which their human rights are undermined. These markets produce harmful outcomes for individuals. Some markets produce perverse social as well as individual outcomes. These markets undermine basic notions of democracy, for example by supporting relations of humiliating subordination or unaccountable power. The implication is that noxious markets must either be prohibited or strictly regulated to mitigate some of the characteristics that make them noxious.
Satz’s empirical cases draw from her extensive and long-standing research on reproductive labour, prostitution, child labour, slavery and organ markets. These are all “difficult trades” that are likely to evoke strong reactions in one way or another. The exception might be organ markets which have attracted a fair amount of the last few years (see e.g. Kieran Healy’s book Last Best Gifts). To Satz’s credit, she manages to conduct a balanced discussion of most issues even if some of her favourite stances are open to debate – see e.g. Cecile Fabre’s review in Ethics.
Furthermore, Satz’s arguments can be used to consider the scope and limits of markets in a much wider setting as briefly discussed in the last chapter of the book. Decisions about the scope of markets raises important issues that cannot – or at least, should not – be appraised by efficiency criteria and delegated to economists. They raise important political as well as moral issues as some politicians and commentators in have recently argued in the UK press – in one case, attracting a fair amount of opprobrium.  The need for a pragmatic approach to markets and politics has perhaps, never been greater. This book makes a very useful contribution to this cause.

Review Note on Debra Satz’s “Why Some Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets”